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ABSTRACT  
A critical re-appraisal of the relationship between deconstruction and democracy seems today to be 
advisable. The very bases of the so-called developed democracies are undermined by a process of de-
socialization of society and by a sort of individualism of indifference. This work will try to outline 
some preliminary reflections in order to question if, starting from Jacques Derrida’s works, a 
philosophical analysis of the ‘concept’ of singularity can be a consistent political counter-strategy in 
behalf of democracy. The complexity of the ‘concept’ as such in Derrida’s works will be stressed, 
showing its fluctuation between two forms: an evenemential and disappearing singularity and a 
persistent, resistant, and possibly existential one. Then the strategic value of this ambivalence within 
the singular/democratic dynamis will be questioned through the filter of Derrida’s interpretation of 
Nietzsche, whose distinctive ideas (such as writing, style, untimeliness) may converge into the notion 
of disarticulation. This will be used as a reading device, by which the philosophical quality of the 
singular/democratic chiasm can be rethought. Disarticulation also reconfigures the arrangement of 
singularity’s ‘internal’ relations, both in an aesthetic-stylistic and in an anthropological sense. From 
this, a significant recalibration of the concept of political engagement – between activity and passivity 
– can be attempted. A concrete example of this engagement may be the theoretical-practical question of 
Derrida’s interviews. They may somehow be conceived as an inventive effort of hybrid writing, where 
singularity appears both problematically disarticulated and ‘democratically’ interlaced to the outside.   
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1. Singularity and/or democracy?  
In the current political scenario, the social texture of the so called advanced 
democracies seems to be more and more torn by what may be termed 
‘individualism of indifference’. In order to contrast this trend, a 
philosophical deepening of the very concept of democracy, both in its 
historical then its theoretical dimensions, seems to be necessary. This, being 
the most logic and common practice, is then the one that philosophers have 
obviously been followed from a long time. But one may also question this 
intellectual schema, someway proposing a shifting of the point of view: may 
a critical discussion on the notion of singularity in itself be a useful 
philosophical-political counter-strategy? Generally speaking, the term 
singularity can always refer to an unpolitical and individual subject; 
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anyway, and the same time, it may also suggests a creative difference within 
the democratic system. Moreover, singularity may be a morphogenetic force 
that can renew democracy, working at the level of its inter-singular relations. 
Thus one can try to rethink democracy through singularity, qua aporetic 
system originally hosting the a-democratic. 
Philosophy must take into account the socio-political reality, and the 
reality of singularity, if it wants to give real answers. One must not delete 
singularity too fast, but read it by a philosophical strategy, in order to 
criticize or deconstruct it, and possibly reconstruct a renewed democracy.   
In this very general and just outlined perspective, this article intends 
examining the role played by the concept of singularity, starting from 
Derrida’s texts and then proceeding beyond, in the frame of a critical re-
appraisal of the relationship between deconstruction and democracy. 
Actually Derrida’s case seems very suitable. In fact from the one hand, 
Derrida has usually been considered a thinker of the democracy – in 
particular of the democracy to come – and not a thinker of the political 
singularity or individuality. But, from the other hand, it is not to be 
forgotten that the term singularity runs diachronically and synchronically 
through the whole Derridean corpus, even if its use does not appear 
immediately clear, and this is true not only in a political sense. 
Some preliminary questions may clarify this sort of complexity. What 
could be the place of singularity in Derrida’s ‘political philosophy’ (if 
something like that exists)? Could singularity as such absolve to a pivotal 
theoretical function in the logical formulation, somehow spectral, of the 
nexus democracy/deconstruction? One could ask, for instance: where is and 
how does it work singularity in the emblematic chiasm ‘no deconstruction 
without democracy, no democracy without deconstruction’1 (Derrida 1994a, 
128)? 
In an interview with Richard Beardsworth, Derrida states that ‘“the 
democracy to come” is a democracy whose bonds are no longer those that 
can be deduced from the concept of democracy, such as this concept has been 
born and developed in the history of the West’. What is today going on in 
the world demands in fact also a deep reconfiguration of intersubjective 
political relations; therefore the democracy to come calls for ‘“bonds [liens] 
between singularities’” (Derrida 1994b, 47-8). This syntagm is crucial. 
Derrida uses it rather rarely, though, even if it occasionally puts in an 
appearance right up to his later works (see Derrida 2003). 
                                                            
1 Where titles of books and articles appear only in French (or Italian), translation from 
the work is mine. 
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At first one is tempted to resolve it within the fundamental syntactic 
architecture of the ‘logical-political’ of Derrida, based on the notion of 
relational disarticulation among political subjects. There is no real democracy 
without a plurality of singularities in relation; but relations must not annul 
the distance: without distance, no relation; without relation, no democracy. 
The singularities interlace the threads, and a democratic new texture of 
relations forms. The word bonds icastically renders the idea of knotting 
without phagocytation. Nevertheless the syntagm’s density persists, especially 
for the ‘philosophical’ sense assigning to ‘singularity’. 
Actually Derrida’s philosophy lectures usually shift the centre of gravity 
of the couple singularity/democracy towards two points, which are 
essentially the pluralisation of the notion of singularity and singularity’s 
relational side. One can share this approach as it situates correctly the figure 
of the bonds among singularities in the theoretical and historical domain 
where it arises, that is within the well known set of Derridean arguments as, 
for instance, the de-localization of the polis or the post-Cold War re-
formulation of the political within a tension polis/cosmopolis. A 
reconstructive politics of singularity, starting from Derrida’s works, has 
prudently been argued from this perspective, among others, by Vaughan-
Williams (2007). This sort of analyses, though, considers the notion of 
singularity in view of something else, that is from an external plane. I instead 
endeavour here to move in the opposite direction, focusing my attention 
mostly on singularity as such.  
Now the question is: does the term singularity not reveal from the very 
start the undeconstructible point in the Derridean ‘X without X’ algebra, 
that is a supplement of impenetrability within Derrida’s thought itself on 
deconstruction of the democratic? 
 
2. Two models of singularity in the same corpus: existence and resistance 
Derrida seems to outline two paradigms of the political dynamics standing at 
the basis of the democracratic, two ‘laws […] irreducible to one another’. On 
the one hand, ‘there is no democracy without “community of friends”’: it is 
the phenomenological intentionality of the democratic, as being-in-relation. 
But, on the other hand, there is no democracy without ‘respect of 
singularity’. These are two ‘tragically irreconcilable’ sides of the same 
problem (Derrida 1994a, 40), since we see here a sort of ‘aporia of the demos’ 
that ‘is at once the incalculable singularity of anyone, before any “subject”’ 
(Derrida 2003, 120). 
But what does Derrida mean by ‘singularity’? There is no systematic or 
exhaustive argument: no ti esti, as always. So what is singularity not? It 
IGOR PELGREFFI 
 
  468 
cannot denote notions such as subjectivity, political subject, citizen of the world 
or human being (Derrida 1994b, 47). Since the anti-metaphysical disposition 
of deconstructive thinking, singularity can never restore the concepts of 
person, ego, individual conscience nor even the idea of an original atom of 
spiritual substance. There is no absolute origin.  
The most frequent meaning of singularity is that of event, the act of 
occurring as such: the singularity is the universal attribute of ‘what happens 
in general’ (Derrida 1994a, 35). Singularity is the constitutive datum of 
experience, but also what exceed the very concept of experience: if ‘each time 
something is singular’ that is because it is ‘singularly iterable’ (Derrida 
1994a, 247). Singularity’s characteristics - ‘individual’ (Derrida 1994a, 36), 
‘lonely’ (Derrida, 1994a, 54), ‘incalculable’ (Derrida, 1994a, 244) - denote a 
neutral pre-subjective form of the ‘each-one [chaque un]’ (Derrida 1994a, 36). 
Anyway ‘in’ each singularity there always remains a trace of the empiric, that 
is the trace of an incalculable and heterogeneous element: singularity is both 
‘absolute’ and ‘of the other’ (Derrida 1994a, 306). The simple form of this 
type of singularity, impersonal and without psychic individuation, tends to 
the geometrical model of an imploding and vanishing point. Its temporality 
is the instant. It exists without essence.  
But there is another meaning, less frequent, which possibly opens to a 
second model of singularity. Singularity is something that resists its 
disappearance. In responding to the question posed by Élisabeth 
Roudinesco, whether ‘the singularity of a subject, even if deconstructed, 
exists and resists’, Derrida states that ‘of course, singularity resists [résiste], 
it remains [reste]. Sometimes it even resists to its being assigned to 
“subjectivity” [même à son assignation à “subjectivité”]’ (Derrida and 
Roudinesco 2001, 163). Its prevalent feature seems to be permanency and 
not adimensionality. May then singularity be considered as something of an 
individual that opposes the System? Derrida significantly declares himself 
very close to Kierkegaard, and states: ‘the absolute existence, the sense he 
gives to the word subjectivity, the resistance of existence to the concept or 
the system, is something I absolutely care about’ (Derrida and Ferraris 1997, 
37). This resistance of existence always implies an ‘ethical-existential pathos’ 
(Derrida and Ferraris 1997, 37), to which usually Derrida adds an 
autobiographical intensity. 
If it is true that already in the early seventies he affirmed that ‘all I 
write is terribly autobiographical’ (Derrida 1972, 15), here he is insistently 
asking ‘who thinks? who signs? What’s to be made of singularity in this 
experience of thinking?’ (Derrida and Ferraris 1997, 33). These are 
problematical points. What is to be made of subjectivity’s deconstruction in 
Derrida’s philosophy? An overflowing question. Of course it should not be 
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assumed that he is here attempting reinstate the ‘subject’ as such, since the 
concept of first-person singular is always approached critically: one must – 
each time – question ‘that which in the autos disrupts self-relationship’. But 
Derrida adds that this happens ‘always in an existential experience that is 
singular’ (Derrida and Ferraris 1997, 37). 
Therefore, the philosophical question is now the following: what could be 
the value of the theoretical difficulty concerning the shifting between two 
forms of singularities, both acting in the same textual corpus? Could it not be 
a symptom of the fact that the totality of ‘his thought is laboured over 
[travaillée] by a fertile tension, divided between a rehabilitation of the ego 
and an egocide [égicide]’ (Rogozinski 2005, 65)? Or could it be that the 
‘second’ singularity tends possibly to compensate for the ‘political’ 
insufficiency of the ‘first’ by an ethical-autobiographical dilation? And it is 
possible to conjecture that the effect of the dilation is a self-ex-position – a 
sort of de-singularisation – of singularity in the democratic space? 
To summarise: the ‘first’ singularity burns itself up in the instant, and it 
is dangerously exposed to its nothingness, into which it suddenly returns. 
The ‘second’ singularity, indeed, remains and seems to be able to resist, also 
politically. It is as if the ‘second’ singularity were demanding, so to speak, a 
degree of spatial and material concreteness. Let us now examine how each of 
the two singularities can be specifically related to the idea of democracy. 
 
 
3. The logical and morphological relation between the two singularities and the 
structure of the democracy to come 
It is well known that, for Derrida, the spatial-temporal constitution of the 
democracy to come it is not univocal. For what that concerns its limits 
pattern, the democracy to come shows a double breaking. There is an 
‘external’ breaking of the infinite horizon of space and of time. For Derrida, 
democracy is always elsewhere: the time and the space of democracy to come 
are a-topic and u-topic. But there is also an ‘internal’ breaking, that is an 
implosion of space and of time, since Derrida think that democracy is, also, 
what I am doing in my historical determined hic et nunc. The time and the 
space of democracy to come is also the singularity of the here-and-now: the 
‘here-now [ici-maintenant]’ of the democracy to come is indeed nothing else 
then ‘the precipitation [précipitation] of an absolute singularity’, an this is 
because there is ‘no singularity without here-and-now’ (Derrida 1993, 60). 
Within this scheme – perhaps excessively dialectic –, a political-
constructive function for the first type of singularity may be drawn by virtue 
of its self-integration in the very structuring of democracy. And since it 
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produces itself in acto, it confirms also the Derridean idea that democracy to 
come is always, also, what I am performatively doing here and now. It should be 
observed also that, from this point of view, the fundamental structure of 
democracy fully subsumes the ambiguous political feature which is typical of 
singularity. Singular, indeed, stays for original, unique, but it stays also for 
suspect, strange. In Derridean terms, this confirms that what is singular is, 
at the same time, a resource and a threat for democracy. Singularity is 
democracy’s pharmakon. 
This deep and someway structural ambivalence may be extended to a 
normative-abstract level. Metaphorically speaking, in relativistic physics the 
general functions defining the relationship between space-time (democracy) 
and any of its points (citizens) undergo a crunch because of gravitational 
singularity. This is the case, for example, of a point deprived of any event 
horizon. Singularity, in this sense, is the internal possibility of the impossible of 
space-time. Singularity is the here-now of system collapse, that is the point 
where physical properties – in so far as they are known to us – degenerate 
and lose every value. But one have to think also that these singular point 
remodel and renew the space-time curvature: singularity (the citizen) 
modifies the space-time (democracy). 
Now this metaphor can help to understand the way by which singularity 
may at once be the democratic’s punctum caecum and its prop, its virtual 
failure and yet its secret glue. Singularity can be the intrademocratic black hole 
of democracy. But then this also suggests that democracy, within the 
experience of singularity, can display its auto-morphologic resource: it 
reorganizes its norm, each time, around points/singularities 
(internal/external elements).  
Vice versa, the shape of the second type of singularity seems to be 
defined in the conceptual domain of strength or resistance. In this case – 
which will be successively clarified – singularity, in Derrida, is the tension of 
‘its’ continuous self-reconfiguration in writing, giving the term the general 
meaning of spacing as externalization of a ‘writing singularity’. This 
singularity moves its first steps, almost invisibly, towards a political stage 
where it avoids its immediate re-absorption into the universal-democratic, 
which is instead precisely what the first type of singularity is fated. However 
this permanency re-inscribes the concept of singularity in the semantic chain 
– traditionally metaphysical – of interiority, described as ‘secret-private-
invisible-illegible-apolitical, ultimately without concept’ (Derrida 1994a, 
308). Deeply problematic terms, such as internal forum, can be found too: ‘for 
me, demanding that everything be paraded in the public square, and that 
there be no internal forum, is already democracy becoming totalitarian’ 
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(Derrida and Ferraris 1997, 53). Nevertheless, Derrida thinks that something 
must resist, within its secret space, if the democratic is to exist.  
Singularity and democracy, here and elsewhere, give rise to a chiasm – 
one seems to necessitate the other – which holds them in an uncertain 
relation: attraction, repulsion, a reciprocal redefinition of their theoretical 
space of existence. 
 
 
4. A brief comparison with the position of Deleuze and Nancy on singularity 
The well known analyses of Gilles Deleuze and Jean-Luc Nancy may afford a 
wider view of the theoretical-political field associated with the notion of 
singularity. In Mille plateaux (Deleuze and Guattari 1980) Deleuze suggests 
that a radical reconfiguration of the politic-democratic domain and therefore 
of individual-society dynamics, may be achieved by the morphogenetic 
power of singularity, the latter being understood as similar to Derrida’s ‘first 
type’ of singularity. Singularity is not individuality, nor subjectivity: it 
precedes individuality, being haecceitas originally occurring. Even when it 
connects itself to the manifold, singularity continues to be autonomous. Thus 
the new relations it determines - by deforming the force lines of the political 
field where it is immersed - emerge as free and creative. Also Nancy, in Être 
singulier pluriel (1999), presents the idea that being singular can work as a 
basis (instable) of the democratic by virtue of its ‘essential’ being-in-relation-
with a kind of manifold. The ‘singularity of each one’ is ‘indissociable from a 
plurality’, to the point of identification: ‘the singular is a plural’ (Nancy 
1999, 52). Nancy – also following Derrida – then proceeds to a deep de-
ontologisation of the philosophical assumptions of the political discourse on 
the democratic. But Derrida’s singularity is something different from being 
singular: it laboriously works the democratic regardless of Nancy’s cum. 
Whatever could be the design (philosophical or post-philosophical) of their 
inter-con-nection to being, singularities in Derrida remain anonymously 
exposed to doubt, without any ontological tension. 
Not unlike Nancy yet closer to Deleuze, there is a différance in Derrida’s 
singularity. The difference consists in the circumstance that, for Derrida, 
singularity’s form fluctuates from an implosive event to something 
approaching resistance, deferment or maybe a writing (of itself). Hence the 
question is now: how can this two so philosophically divergent extremes be 
conceptualised together? Let us now attempt a tactical digression to another 
Derridean topos: Nietzsche.  
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5. Singularity and democracy. Derrida passing through Nietzsche 
Nietzsche is for Derrida also a thinker of individual singularity. His 
relationship with the modern idea of democracy is very problematic, being 
based on a radical form of anarchical singularity. The term anarchical should 
be considered carefully, since it denotes a groundless political-philosophical 
attitude (an-arché), but, at the same time, a placing of oneself outside any 
possible oppositional logic, including that logic that reactively each time re-
forms itself after any anarchical opening. After all, this Nietzschean quality 
of singularity resonates both in the functioning of the concept of singularity 
in Deleuze and in the provisionally de-liée feature of Nancy’s being singular.  
In the very same years, when Derrida finally elaborates the grammar 
and the syntax of the democracy to come, and, even if only to some extent, 
turns out a number of observations on the existential-resistant singularity – 
for instance those referred to Kierkegaard –, Nietzsche is once again at the 
centre of his thinking. Let us examine now how in Derrida’s reading 
Nietzsche captures the point of the functional generality of the democratic, 
and how (and the crux of the matter lies precisely in this ‘how’) in doing this 
he makes plain the correlation between singularity and democracy.  
In texts such Politques de l’amitié (1994a) or Nietzsche and the Machine 
(1994b), one of the leitmotivs is the idea that in order to interpret reality in a 
philosophically convincing way, and from here also the aporetic structure of 
democracy to come, one needs to start, every time, from a text like Nietzsche’s. 
This appears self-disarticulated, open both to contradictions and to an extra-
dialectical excess of contradictions.  
The idea of disarticulation of textuality is somehow a final development of 
the work on the notions of writing and style, that marked Derrida’s initial 
interpretation of Nietzsche’s philosophy, in the well known texts of the 
sixties and seventies. This line of thinking may already be seen in the 1976 
lecture Otobiographies, in which Derrida clarifies that the deeply 
philosophical value of Nietzsche’s writing and style(s) does not lie simply 
‘inside’ his propositions, but also in their property as being a whole: ‘all 
statements, before and after, left and right, are at once possible (Nietzsche 
said it all, more or less) and necessarily contradictory (he said the most 
mutually incompatible things, and he said that he said them)’ (Derrida 1984, 
60). Nietzsche’s textuality is built on a void among propositions, the 
disarticulating element that allows it to work in a instable manner: a 
continual forming and unmaking of figures of sense (virtuality) and the 
paralysis in front of the infinity of freedom of virtuality, that is the not-
being-anymore-possible of any statement (aporia) (see Derrida 1986).  
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A constitutive disarticulation is the property that makes Nietzschean 
textuality a sort of transcendental structure of his philosophy, that is the 
condition of possibility and functioning of his philosophical discourse. As a 
result, Derrida’s interpretation makes clear the formal analogy between this 
instable or a-sensical transcendental structure and the law modeling the 
primary inner movement of the democracy to come. The syntactic-logical form 
is the same: a syntax without syntax; a rhetoric (virtually endlessly) of the 
contraries reversing one into the other; a logic of the dangerous peut-être. The 
latter leads to a mode of thinking beyond true/false and all metaphysical 
dualisms. It is a counter-logic and, at the same time, an a-logic that may 
disarticulate time itself: here Nietzsche’s untimeliness and Derrida’s concept 
of à venir tend to converge (Derrida 1994, 67-92).  
It is important to point out the following: to begin to think adequately 
the democracy to come requires a violent, and almost corporal, reconfiguration 
of what we mean for ‘theoretical’. It requires the assumption of the 
semantics of the seism and vibration, shaking the very basis of the syntax 
and logic (theoretical and political). In these Derridean texts it is suggested 
that in orserd to allow a deep metamorphosis of rationality, a Nietzschean 
filter becomes necessary. One must face the typical paralysis of reason, which 
is an autogenic enigma that, ‘because it paralyses, it also engenders, 
stimulates’ thought (Derrida 1986, 136). The aporia causes shifting or 
‘displacement of thinking’ - supplements of rationality inside rationality - 
because ‘the figures of rationality are profiled and outlined in the madness of 
aporetic’ (Derrida 1986, 132-3). 
In order to understand the out-of-jointness of reality and time, one must 
accept a hybrid form of textual rationality. This rationality lets itself be run 
through by disarticulation. It is not irrationality, but a new and creative 
effort to comprehend the madness of time - its alea and Unheimlich - by a 
deranged reason, capable of inscribing ‘itself in the back of reason’, peering 
into its dark side and ‘re-organizing the tradition’s identifications of what is 
rational and what is irrational’ (Derrida 1994b, 22). Through Nietzsche reason 
can rediscover itself qua the paradoxical-necessary activity of Selbstkritik.   
If this is, in broad terms, the universal and abstract side of Nietzschean 
textuality, what is its singular side? Let us go back to basics of Derrida’s 
interpretation. Essentially, Nietzsche is always the one who writes, 
strategically putting philosophy into crisis by a gesture that is basically a-
theoretical and singular-stylistic: ‘Nietzsche has written what he has written. 
He has written that writing – and first of all his own – it is not originally 
subordinate to the logos and to truth’ (Derrida 1984a, 19). The keystone, 
therefore, must be found in the what of Nietzschean écriture. 
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6. Corpus and disarticulation. The morpho-logical level of the analysis 
Nietzsche writes. He produces written objects, and they agglomerate 
themselves in a superabundant, apparently instable and more-than-
contradictory corpus (Derrida 1994a, 96-9): an internally disarticulated 
corpus.  
Disarticulation is, consequently, inside the Nietzschean corpus, qua 
active morphé; but it is in his textuality as well, qua a general ‘logical’ form. 
A reciprocal exchange takes place between the material corpus and textuality 
(as transcendental) at an ambiguous, auto-morpho-logic level. The writing 
singularity of Nietzsche is deeply rooted in that being-written.  
Nevertheless, in relation to his corpus, Nietzsche is not only passive: he 
also actively writes his own textuality. Thus Nietzsche’s writing somehow 
shifts itself, becoming ‘writing of textuality’. As a consequence the very 
concept of ‘style of writing’ has to change. It can no longer only be referred 
to the style of a proposition, of an aphorism, nor even of a whole book, but 
style qua control on the overproduction of writing and qua orchestration and 
self-discipline on one’s own written parts. Style is then understood in its 
aesthetical-anthropological multidimensionality, as in Nietzsche’s notion of 
great style (not mentioned by Derrida).  
Now the concept of disarticulation can help us find a philosophical 
connection between the democratic universal and singularity. 
On the one hand disarticulation is all pervading: it works – and 
unceasingly replicates itself – in the textuality, in ‘the real’ and a fortiori in 
the de-structuring structuring of the democracy to come itself. Disarticulation 
‘is’ inside time: there ‘is’ an inner articulation in the instant, which disjoints 
the metaphysical unity of the present. Disarticulation pervades perhaps even 
being, by a sui generis form of ‘ontology of the interruption’ – but here we 
are perhaps going too far, beyond Derrida’s own intentions – in which every 
entity can exist only starting from a fracture within being. 
Then again, disarticulation is nothing more than the trace of the 
singularity of Nietzsche. 
Disarticulation is the structural property both of the general and of the 
singular. In this light the disarticulated-disarticulating writing of Nietzsche 
can be taken as a paradigm. This passage help us to understand the kernel of 
the problem ‘singularity/democracy’, that is the way by which their chiasm 
become possible and historical: singularity de-singularises itself through 
democratisation, and democracy subsumes its a-democratic singular side. 
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7. The living convergence ‘in’ Nietzsche of the two models of singularities 
It is now time to examine in depth the following question: how can the two 
singularities – the evenemential one and the existential-autobiographical one 
– find in Nietzsche their plane of convergence? 
Nietzsche reinvents the disarticulation, each time. Affirmation and 
repetition: a doubling of singularity, in the structure of eternal recurrence of 
the same, combined with the iterability of the signature’s auto(bio)graphism 
(see Derrida 1984b). Each time Nietzsche begins to write, in the here-now of 
writing, the law is threatened by the very same principium from which it 
derives. Yet only thus can the novel, proper to disarticulation, take place and 
have time. Nietzsche’s gesture of singular invention, hubristic, hyperbolic or 
even anti-democratic (Derrida 1994b, 30), prevents textuality from being 
pureness and a-historical. Singularity grants the quasi-trascendental of the 
democracy to come.  
Nevertheless, and this is a very thorny topic, Nietzsche does also another 
thing: he lets himself be traversed by disarticulation. In a sense Nietzsche is 
acted by disarticulation, and, simultaneously, he tries to resist it. Thus 
Nietzsche synthesizes this stylistic-anthropological contradiction, always 
reminding us, by his act of writing, the singular vertigo of responsibility. In a 
way it is an extreme and haematic writing practice: writing of (and in) the 
body. In doing so, Nietzsche embodies the extremes of reason – extrema ratio – 
that is precisely what letting himself be traversed by disarticulation amounts 
to. In a sense, the pieces of Nietzsche, that is his remains (of writing), are 
enigmatically in front of him. But he tries to re-shape his corpus. Therefore 
the pieces of Nietzsche are not only the efforts of an impressionist of 
philosophy: Nietzsche’s writing is instead a cubist writing. His writing is an 
artistic expression which discloses itself to what I propose to name a cubism 
of reflection. This means that in the same picture different perspectives act 
together; thought dislocations take place within the same pattern of thought; 
figures of rationality move themselves within rationality. Here lies the logical 
centre of Nietzschean textual rationality. Anyway it is not a matter of pure 
rationality, because, while approaching it, something happens to thought 
itself, to the very self of thought. Thought disarticulates itself. With 
Nietzsche, thought is ‘perhaps unleashed all the more violently and with all 
the more freedom’; but this is obtained ‘with all the more suffering’ (Derrida 
1994b, 21).  
The reference to suffering must be underlined, since in his philosophy 
Derrida has seldom made it explicit. Suffering leads to a corporal dimension 
of the disarticulation. Therefore, somehow, it contaminates the conceptual 
pureness of disarticulation. 
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Finally Nietzsche, in Derrida’s texts, is a complex field of writing: 
expressionism of pain is always superimposed over the cubism of reflection. 
Nietzsche is always – in Derrida’s corpus and thought – the text-Nietzsche, 
the dynamis body-corpus, where his pathetical writing arises from his self-
disarticulation. Accordingly, disarticulation is both a general structure and a 
physical ‘presence’. 
This is the reason why Nietzsche’s disarticulation should be seen as an 
element capable both of deeply penetrating the structure of the democratic 
and secretly innervate the corporal space of democratic (this last being also 
the space where the anthropological style arises, and where the singularity of 
the strength and resistance works).  
As should be apparent to a Derridean reader, behind Nietzsche one can 
glimpse Derrida himself; the themes of hybris, of the singular ‘origin’ of the 
writing act or of the ‘quasi-trascendental’ are instances of this, as well as 
that kind of (problematic) autobiographism of the corpus, of his writing’s 
remains, and of physical pain too (the latter theme is not typically 
Derridean, but beginning in these years on, it comes out more and more 
tangibly in between the lines of his ‘autobiographism’). All of the foregoing 
backs up the thesis – already contended at length by many authors, among 
whom Christopher Norris (1982) – that Nietzsche and Derrida ‘seem often 
engaged in a kind of uncanny reciprocal exchange’ (Norris 1982, 57).  
It should be pointed out that right here, in these texts of the nineties, 
the level of exchange is complex. Both Derrida and Nietzsche self-
deconstruct their own philosophy. But, in addition to this mutual similarity, 
I state that it is more evident also the strategic role played by either of their 
singularities in this self-deconstructing movement. This addiction can be 
significant.  
 
 
8. The dynamis between singularities models as primitive space of political-
existential engagement 
After this long detour through Nietzsche, I came back to my main inquiry, 
asking if, in view of what has been discussed so far, a generalization can be 
drawn with regards singularity. Disarticulation and its seismic dynamic are 
all pervading. Moreover, we ‘belong to this tremor, if this is possible; we 
treble within it’ (Derrida 1994a, 98), even thought it be in the ‘X without X’ 
syntax of the belonging without belonging. 
If the writing-written singularity is – or at least exists – qua 
reconfiguration of itself, this can only be in the complex field between 
activity and passivity: activity consists of producing one’s own philosophical 
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discourse, through the orchestration-writing of one’s own textuality; 
passivity consists of being severed by the intra-extra opening that precedes, 
determines and moves singularity.  
Singularity can always take the form of an evenemential phenomenon. 
In this case its here-now coincides with the here-now of democracy to come. 
This coincidence is the immotus motor of democracy. Anyway if one stopped 
here, this would be a sterile structure, since the singularity would be 
transparent with respect to the democratic.  
What the previous analyses suggest (chiefly the relation Derrida-
Nietzsche I have just discussed), it is rather then one must join to this model 
of singularity another model, that is a writing singularity. This last ‘wants’ 
to space itself, it finally suffers since it is also something else. In other words: 
a singular form of orchestration working upon its own writing remains, exposed 
in the public-democratic space. 
The incoherent movement between the two singularities, never attaining 
a synthesis, shows an evident theoretical insufficiency. But it is possible that 
this insufficiency may nonetheless translate into something productive, as 
well as an innovative ‘frame’ of engagement politique. Let’s see better, and 
trace briefly the schema. 
Engagement needs singularity, but it is not unpolitical. How is it 
possible? This is because engagement connotes, first of all, an ex-position that 
is public, a sort of predisposition to the continuous reconfiguration of the 
‘what’, that is of the object I have written. Each time one must restart from 
the remains. Moreover, one must let one’s own crisis (on the personal-
political level) work. This predisposition is already work: a working on myself 
through the disarticulated autobiography of my traces, which can never 
come to unity; work as secular ostensio of my disarticulated corpus. This 
work, that completely wears itself out between forming and exfoliating, is 
already my political engagement.  
In this context Nietzsche (and Derrida too, be it behind, through, or 
maybe even beyond Nietzsche) calls for supplementary philosophical 
attention in perceiving and interpreting one’s own crisis (‘my’ constitutive 
disarticulation) as something coming also from outside. Its hidden matrix lies 
in the interweaving between the evenemential singularity and the 
autobiographical one.  
This engagement will operatively work towards a re-calibration of the 
decomposition acting between my public and my private sphere, concretely 
granting a piece of outside into ‘my’ inside and, at the same time, translating 
a piece of my-self – democratizing it – into the public space. ‘What have we 
here’, the reader may ask, ‘the recurrent motif of man discovering himself 
qua political entity suspended and held between singularity and democracy’? 
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Actually, today’s question is quite different: how can one concretely be 
active/passive? How can being-singular-in-democracy be made to become 
concrete through engagement? The elusive dynamis private-public that 
replicates the most general body-corpus reaches here its climax of 
incomprehensibility.  
 
 
9. Derrida and the interview: reformulating engagement, between activity and 
passivity of writing  
Engagement always risks remaining hypothetical, restricted to abstract 
analysis. In order to avoid over-abstraction, I propose now to examine – 
even if in a very preliminary way – the issue of Derrida’s interviews as a 
special form of philosophical communication in which Derrida is concretely 
en situation, uncertainly situated between activity (being-writing) and 
passivity (being-written) and perhaps engaging in a form of self-
disarticulation of his ‘own’ singularity.  
When Derrida answers questions in an interview, in the here-now of its 
occurrence, what happens? What is the philosophical value of his writing, if 
any? As a matter of fact he has given a great number of authorised interviews 
(about two hundred). Critics, showing little caution about their textual 
statute, have widely used these interviews, frequently quoting entire 
passages of Derrida’s answers, and possibly advantaging themselves of their 
prose qualities: condensation, brevitas, informality. As such, the interview 
may be considered as representing Derrida’s singularity as a writer: one of his 
many styles, and notably an attractive pseudo-aphoristic form of writing. 
This stylistic simplification may also be considered as a partially 
intentional popularisation (and a democratisation) of his philosophy. 
Generally speaking, an interview always implies the author’s pre-disposition 
to the ex-position of his political commitment: in theory, through an 
interview one can take part in the public arena by space-temporal and 
material modalities that can be very different from those specific to an essay 
or a book. One need only think of the capillary circulation (space) and the 
rapidity of reception (time) of an interview, as well as of its further-future 
possibilities thanks to innovative media on the internet. But simplification 
can become also a notable theoretical problem for Derrida’s philosophy: an 
excess of evidence and easiness of his writing, with all the consequent risks of 
over-exposition and, not last, his becoming someway a cultural object of 
consumption or a ‘fetish-philosophy’.  
On the formal level, each time a writing singularity enters the complex 
field of an interview, something intervenes and modifies it. At the basis of 
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every interview (inter-view; entre-tien) there is an interruption of ‘my’ 
writing, which is the disarticulation that takes place between question and 
answer, an empty margin that reconfigures ‘my’ writing. Through this white 
void, ‘my’ writing enters-into-relation with an inter and discovers itself as 
being built on discontinuity. The ‘outside’ intervenes on the ‘inside’, and 
breaks into it. Even if it evolves into a conversation or a dialogue, the 
interview, in its essence, is not speaking-together: no cum (con-versation), but 
interruption. Therefore no conciliation or hermeneutical fusion, but a 
vigilance against becoming the same speech. 
‘My’ writing is deformed by the other: aphorisation is unintentional, 
‘my’ rhetoric and conceptual concatenations are hetero-directed by an 
extraneous palimpsest. There will be a recording, editing and direction: these 
actions, thought, can not always be fully controlled by me. I am surprised 
and exceeded by the other, whatever the other’s appearance may be: an 
unpredictable question, a meaningless pause, the choice of the material 
supports of recording and publication, or of the interview’s title (a 
peritextual element which is obviously crucial in Derrida’s strategy of 
writing).   
However, Derrida is fully aware of this complexity. There are more and 
more interviews over the years, and in different formats too: radiointeviews, 
videointerviews, up to an ideal extension in the documentary-film, where 
Derrida features as the actor of himself. It can be affirmed that Derrida 
accepts the genre of interview-writing. This means that somehow he 
‘concedes’ himself: he grants interviews and gives a part of the ‘self’ to this 
techno-logical exteriority of writing. 
The significant shift, concerning these matters, is the nature of this 
acceptance. It is a concrete attitude: it represents a sort of practical 
translation of many general themes of deconstruction (such as the ‘original’ 
contamination, or the ambiguity outside/inside of écriture). Derrida 
authorises the threat of the heterogeneous to install itself in the very centre of 
‘his’ writing; he allows his writing to be run through by many different 
registers, which are irreducible to the logos, like chance, improvisation, all the 
technical delocalised devices and procedures, and also the iconic and sonic 
register of the documentary.  
In other words, Derrida accepts an epoché of his creative-stylistic 
singularity, a de-singularisation of writing. Might not this be considered a 
movement toward democratic ex-position? Let us go back to the very 
decisive point, that is Derrida’s awareness of the disarticulation running 
through him. For example, when he proofreads an interview transcription 
before its publication, he tries ‘to integrate and calculate the fact that it will 
be read at another pace’ compared to a book, in which his writing singularity 
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can express itself by ‘breath’, ‘syntax’ or ‘rhythm’. But he must admit that 
it is a ‘very difficult, if not impossible’ calculation (Derrida and Stiegler 
1996, 101). Thus we are confronted a logical friction between the self-
awareness of being conditioned (a state into which one voluntarily enters) 
and the choice of letting-things-be and they need to be. Derrida confesses that 
the interview always entails a ‘discomfort [disage]’, a ‘rigid and artificial’ 
speaking (Derrida and Stiegler 1996, 109) to which, moreover, he consciously 
subjects himself, by embodying estrangement. 
The irreconcilability of these two aspects (awareness of the ambiguity of 
the interview-structure and the decision of letting-it-be) does not fully lie at 
a level at which a philosophical quality (moral, ethical, theoretical, political) 
may be derived. Perhaps it hints at another level of the singular 
responsibility, a deeper and possibly existential level. 
 
 
10. Engagement politique 
This is precisely the level at which the reformulation of engagement politique 
may be found. No traditional philosophical model of commitment allows for 
a share of Gelassenheit to be integrated into its concept. Thought is 
contaminated with the empirical, it resonates with the empirical. It lets itself 
be run through by technology, but it stays alert as well. Thought concerns 
‘the will’ but also an ‘experience of a “radical passivity”’ (Derrida 1994b, 
62). The mutual contaminations of activity and passivity are already praxis 
that contaminates the very paradigm of ‘my own’, of the ‘own’ as such, and 
of singularity qua figure of the own. All this produces effects on me in the 
first place. 
It is, of course, an acting contradiction, namely the contradiction that 
structures the engagement. In this movement of meta-awareness, technique 
permanently threatens singularity, for it runs through and disarticulates my 
singular writing. But – Derrida reminds us – singularity is not simply 
opposed to technique, their relationship not being defined in terms of ‘an 
opposition’, because ‘they are irreducibly tied [liées], but there is a tension 
[tension], one must not minimize the tension’ (Derrida and Stiegler 1996, 95). 
I know (but here the very concept of savoir, like those of commitment 
and awareness, wavers) my exposure to disarticulation, and I accept it: I give 
myself in to the interview and I partially ex-author/ise myself. 
Here one can recognize the previously mentioned meaning of political 
engagement qua work of reconfiguration. Engagement must be a continuous 
calibration of the organization and of relations (theoretical, technical, 
corporeal) of one’s writing of oneself. This goes beyond any real or definitive 
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choice between ‘control and not-control’ or ‘mastery [mâitrise] and not-
mastery’. The logic of choice as such must change: ‘“choice” between different 
configurations of mastery without mastery’ is not once and for all, but is 
each time and assumes a ‘phenomenal form of a war, of a conflicting tension 
among several [plusieurs] appropriation forces, several control strategies’ 
(Derrida and Stiegler 1996, 46) acting on my interruption, on my remains. 
But the very point that, in a sense, summarizes and synthetizes all the 
threads of my arguments, is that in order to make real the singularity à venir 
of the democratic, a critical awareness of that hybrid morphology is needed. 
Even if all this involves only minimal shifts, and on a very subtle 
philosophical level, for Derrida it also clearly concerns, and à venir, the 
universal organization of historical and material relationships. One must pay 
extreme attention, and Derrida does, to the spectral functioning of the media 
in their techno-political dimension. But that is not enough. This metalevel of 
philosophy requires a difference. I am constitutively implicated – en situation 
– in the interviews. I am involved qua engagé, and engagé qua involved.  
For example, the emersion of one’s own public image constitutes a 
phenomenon that shows, at least for Derrida, a number of evident 
contradictions between, to simplify, the inspiration towards a not institutable 
philosophy and that towards an image of his philosophy – and of himself – 
that tends to institutionalise itself. Engagement, in this case, means that 
Derrida is required to manage his ‘own’ image.  
One can observe that the real novelty in the figure of the engagement as 
far as I have tried to suggest, it is the concept of managing: managing 
tension involves an alteration in the awareness level. However, these 
considerations may reveal a common predicament too: it is always difficult 
to see oneself, to see one’s own self-recording over again. Everybody is, and 
experiences themselves – today much more than in the past – as the techno-
morpho-logic set of their protean and metamorphic archive-corpus of writing. 
Each published interview can present ‘one’ image of Derrida, or a 
provisionally stable set of images. But it also brings his up-to-then 
established public image(s) back into focus again, thus overwriting, 
modifying, and deleting it, all of which yields a further possibility for the 
orchestrating style of my written-traces, for managing the corpus of my 
recorded remains (fatally ex-posed to my outside). The relative easiness of the 
interview (today also available as a live-performance, or on internet TV, 
which can always develop into a video-message form of a self-interview, and 
involve a potentially enormous number of singularities in the world) 
introduces a creative shift, that is: a virtually permanent possibility of self-
controlling ‘my’ public image. Derrida can be the hidden director of his 
being-subjected-to-interviews. He can intensify or reduce interviews, misdirect 
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the reader, describe himself autrement, disarticulating or pluralizing ‘his’ 
public image, by manipulating his agenda and working on minimal 
displacements of his image between one interview and another. It is a very 
sophisticated form of engagement as self-decentralisation, écriture et différance 
of himself from himself, which is immediately and ambiguously theoretical-
practical. It looks like a heterotropy of ‘his own’ image, possibly not all that 
distant from the one strategically pursued by Michel Foucault with his 
interviews galaxy. 
 
 
11. Overall assessment about the interview qua engagement 
As pointed out by Peter Sloterdijk, perhaps the intellectual path of Derrida 
has been characterized by a ‘constantly alert concern not to be pinned down 
to one particular identity’ as well as by the ‘conviction that his place could 
only be at the forefront of intellectual visibility’ (Sloterdijk 2009, x). The 
sharp observation of Sloterdijk specifies also the double sphere of action of 
this tension. This tension is produced first in the media-sphere. But it is also 
in the existential singularity of Derrida, since ‘he experienced himself’ as a 
place of disarticulation between ‘mutually incompatible evidences’, concretely 
extending in ‘the tireless insistence on the ambiguity and polyvalence of 
signs and statements’ (Sloterdijk 2009, ix-x) of his thought-writing style.  
The place where ethical-anthropological style, contradiction, and writing 
of the corpus cohabit, is precisely the space where we can, and must, rethink 
engagement. The latter is, in fact, essentially production and vigilance: one 
must know and experience the tension. The tension has a compound nature: 
it is also corporeal. It involves a ‘real transformation of the body’. In my 
reconfiguration – shifting incessantly between technical artifactuality and 
my resistance to it – I let myself be run through by passivity. Thus ‘little by 
little another body invents itself [s’invente], modifies itself, proceeds towards 
its subtle mutation [subtile mutation]’ (Derrida and Stiegler 1996, 109).  
But a reflection on the interview completely exceeds the mere critical 
analysis of the media. The inter refers to a being-inter which perhaps is the 
form of a new all-embracing situation. I propose, then, to think about it in 
terms of an ‘être-en-situation-of-the-interview’. 
I force through this point of my analysis, someway to propose a 
reference with the existential, or Sartrian, concept of être-en-situation. The 
philosophical meaning of this gesture, to say it in a very condensed form, is 
to complicate and interlace the diad singular/universal with the inter 
dimension. It may sound quite strange to graft a Sartian semantics on 
Derrida’s. As well as it may sound not clear how one can put into relation the 
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concept of engagement with the condition of being in situation. In Derrida the 
form of the engagement is different from Sartre’s, and more composite. For 
example: it is a positive action, but paradoxically it also can be negative, 
because the engagement consists also in a coming away of the subject, and in 
the movement between the two modalities. 
Anyway one can think that all these difficulties shows the shape of a new 
concept of engagement, which can somehow take into account the historical 
and technological differences intervened between pre- and post-structuralism 
thought. 
What I called ‘être-en-situation-of-the-interview’ must then be conceived, 
but also experienced, as a tension-engagement towards the being-in-democracy.  
Thus in its very first stage – a larval morphogenetic ‘activity’ – my 
political commitment is the effort exerted within this paradoxical condition. 
The inside must be turned inside out: other voices will make up the 
interview’s writing. They will import an intermittence into ‘my’ writing, 
which is democratically heterogeneous with respect to the intermittences I 
may also auto-introduce. I never fully master my engagement. 
The post-postmoderne condition is this: there are questions, one writes 
answers. Each action is an answer. One should reorganize, hold, leave; one 
should ‘know’ that the structure of the interview is as much a ‘powerful 
programming machine’ as life itself with its ambivalences. In its widest sense 
and relevance the interview requires also a form of political resistance against 
both life and technique, against the very technique of writing. It demands an 
intellectual-corporal evolution. It is clear that here the speculative tension is 
stronger then ever, perhaps unbearable for philosophy. 
However de facto tension exists, as well as singularity. This last 
consideration leads to a further question, which can only be mentioned here: 
who maintains, keeps and sustains the tension of engagement? Who is the 
subject of an interview? Who is the object? Who exists-resists? An evident 
answer is: the philosopher engagé. Even if it is true that the autos is 
disarticulated, perhaps a revenant of the existential-autobiographical side in 
Derrida’s works return here. And it is haunting. This revenant is perhaps 
visible in the heretical form of an existentialism of writing, of himself and of 
his ‘own’ remains, more and more patent in the so called ‘late Derrida’.  
 
 
12. Être-en-situation and the being-in-democracy: the singularity à venir 
Coming near to the end, I would like to propose to make all the different 
lines of my paper converging into some final questions, opening a further 
development. The question of singularity, in and/or out of democracy, has 
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led to the question about the tension between the two singularities models. 
Passing through Nietzsche, the problem gained a more existential level, 
notably in Derrida too. From these arguments, then, it arises the consequent 
question of the philosophical quality of my engagement, and from this the 
discussion was taken to the example of the hybrid writing. 
But finally, what if the interview were to be thought of as the premise of 
a co-action? As a place of relations among singularities, at first intra-singular 
and then inter-singular? As an à venir form of philosophical co-writing that 
could sketch a singular-democratic political matrix?  
The inter of the interview certainly represents a theoretical space that 
can be located within the borders of traditional philosophical concepts only 
with considerable difficulty. The general structure of many urgent problems 
is nevertheless inscribed in the inter. Take, for instance, the democratic 
participation of singularities in relation to cyberdemocracy. Today the 
effects of the constitutive ambiguity of the latter are patent. They are 
ramified in our experience of ‘the real’, from the a-sociality of social 
networks to the net-autobiographism flow, increasingly less controllable, for 
‘authors’ too. Maybe the latter is no more than a teenager internet 
phenomenon. In any case teenagers are, here-now, the à venir voters. This 
shows, once again, the deep nexus between the here-now and the structure of 
the democracy to come. This example shows also the unpredictable outcomes 
for ‘democracy’ that this flow of writing, images and scripts of all sorts, or – 
to put it philosophically – this concrete net-anthropological externalization 
of ‘the singular self’, may imply.  
But it should be added that what I denoted as inter, except for its 
implications in these and many other techno-political modern-day instances, 
may have been thought in its somehow universal philosophical quality. I 
suggest, in fact, that the first motility of the singularity/democracy chiasm, 
that is its first larval figure, rises from disarticulation. Disarticulation is 
always the atopic place where democracy can be fecundated by singularity 
and singularity can democratise itself by de-singularising.  
It is not only a matter of acknowledging this fact, but to rethink 
philosophically the complexity of the inter, and hence of the being-inter as 
well as of the significance of democratic engagement. In the sense I try to 
illustrate below, at this level the signs and the intuitions I have traced in 
Derrida’s work – perhaps going beyond his intentions – may have affinities 
with other voices of the contemporary philosophical scene. In Sloterdijk’s 
spherology (1998), for instance, it is no a coincidence that the semantics of 
his boundary entities (indispensable to the sphere qua separation/link 
between inside and outside) like the membrane, the placenta and many 
others, develop around the Latin prefix inter. By virtue of the implicit 
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connections that one can establish between the concepts of interior, 
interstitial and intermediality, the term inter enables the spheres – since they 
are, somehow, also intermediate entities – to function as an anthropological 
anticipation of the modern-day media. The ‘être-en-situation-of-the-
interview’ is not far of. 
Yet again, at a different level – not onto-anthropological but logical-
dialectical –, the decisive role of inter in Slavoj Žižek’s thought on the 
interpassive subject (1998) shows up in the disarticulation and re-articulation 
of the fundamental dichotomy subject/object. The notion of interactivity – 
which reveals itself as ‘false activity’ – and the related idea of my being 
‘passive through the other’ lead Žižek to the general thesis that ‘perhaps, the 
fundamental attitude which defines the subject is neither that of passivity 
nor that of autonomous activity, but precisely that of interpassivity’ (Žižek 
1998). 
These examples may suggest that, qua general property, wherever it may 
be found inter brings along with itself the ambiguous quality of 
active/passive or inside/outside. The inter exhibits a strange quality of self-
generation, that may even be a philosophical quality: the inter, in fact, is 
almost two kinds of philosophical objects. It is a concept; it is the streaming 
in ‘the real’ of the concept. Its ambiguity also affects the political field. 
All I argued so far, about singularity and its tension, about engagement 
and ‘être-en-situation-of-the-interview’, can of course imply that 
reconstructing democracy on singularity is always subject to failure. That is 
because not only are singularities with respect to democracy permanently 
‘dissymmetrical and heteronomic’ (Derrida 1994a, 222), but also because 
singularities can always be ‘anonymous’ and infinitely ‘indifferent’ (Derrida 
1994a, 129). Hence one can see how singularities are also virtually implosive 
points (democracy’s black holes). After all, this is not far from the way 
singularity has been usually thought in the history of western philosophy. 
When predicated of infinite indifference and anonymity, singularities become 
similar to Leibnitian monads: entities with no doors or windows, and whose 
gates are often nothing but the illusory shadow of interactivity. Otherwise, 
they tend to Epicurean gods: absolutely indifferent, living in their 
intermundia. This last is notably an equivalent, but inverse, spatiality with 
respect to that of the interstitials between monadic spheres (and, once again, 
one can see the inner relation between the notions of singularity, monad, 
sphere and the morpho-logic of the inter). 
With regards to all these problems, Derrida leaves us with no solution, 
not even with any real or somehow tentatively useable guideline. In his 
thinking, singularity itself represents also the impenetrability of/by thought. 
His thought here, as elsewhere, remains problematic and not thematic: à 
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venir. That having been said, he questions the complexity inside the idea of 
re-placement of sungularity. From here, a new kind of engagement arises qua 
productive aporia between different types of singularities. This engagement is 
conceived within a pathetic-existential tension, a physical suffering of 
commitment and contradiction, that ultimately means: the effort of a 
continuous self-reconfiguration of my writing, of concepts, of my body, and 
of the relationship between me and my remains. 
In this sense, Derrida seems to illuminate about a double level of the 
problem concerning singularity/democracy. One level: the realism of the 
great trouble in modeling a democracy upon the concept of singularity. One 
other level: the necessity of something innovative concerning singularity. 
The two levels are superimposed. The new way of thinking singularity could 
be a political counter-strategy as far as it opens to an existential singularity. 
This last can be concrete as far as it remains anti-metaphysical. 
This is the meaning both of being engagé and of the democratic 
singularity. But this singularity is not here, but always à venir. To end, with 
Derrida’s words: ‘this means that one must not renounce, but – this comes 
slowly, this is little by little – […] one must change all these spaces and these 
times. Perhaps one day this may be done in a better way, I hope so’ (Derrida 
and Stiegler 1966, 125). 
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